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We investigate a rural household’s decision to migrate part or all of its labor to urban areas.
Labor migrates only when the expected return passes a hurdle rate that is aﬀected by migration
networks. We develop a dynamic model of incomplete information, and characterize the unique
pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Based on the predictions of the equilibrium, we develop
a set of econometric models to estimate the migration decisions. Our results show that more current
information helps migration, while the expectation of more information in the future may higher
migration.
Key Words: migrant network, strategic delay, information externalities, real options.With Chinas accession into the WTO, arguably the most signiﬁcant challenge facing its agri-
cultural sector is the ensuant foreign competition. Without government subsidies, reduced returns
to traditional farming will likely put more pressure on the already surplus agricultural labor force.
Although subsidies can help alleviate poverty and inequality, fundamentally, especially in the long
run, the agriculture sector can only be saved by increasing its own competitiveness. Given the
labor surplus and land scarcity, migration of rural labor force to non-agricultural sectors, including
migration to urban areas, is an inevitable consequence of or even a necessary condition for a more
competitive agriculture.
This paper investigates a rural households decision to migrate part or all of its labor force
to urban areas. Diﬀerent from other production activities such as farming and local oﬀ-farm
employment, migration is unique in that it incurs signiﬁcant sunk and ﬁxed costs, including costs
of transportation and networking. Networking is especially important: a migrant relies heavily on
other migrants from the same area in ﬁnding jobs. Further, it takes eﬀorts to join the network,
and a migrants network expands as he stays longer in the urban area. Thus, once an individual
migrates (and successfully ﬁnds a job), he will return to the rural area only after enough income is
generated to cover the sunk costs. That is, labor migration hours are typically “chunky.”
Expecting that sizable sunk costs have to be incurred to migrate, and facing uncertainty in
the earnings and the probability of ﬁnding a job, a rural labor may be reluctant to migrate for
two reasons: risk aversion and hysteresis. If he is risk averse, uncertainty in the migration income
means that the expected utility from migration is lower. But even if he is risk neutral, he may have
incentive to wait and gather more information about the potential payoﬀ from migration before
committing the sunk costs. Typically, such information may be obtained from others who have
migrated, and from the news media.
We ﬁrst develop a theoretical model to investigate the interaction among migration network,
information and hysteresis. In particular, we show that local network reduces migration hysteresis
1in three ways. First, a larger network provides better starting information for a potential migrant,
and more information (or less uncertainty) reduces the hysteresis involved in the migration decisions.
Second, to the extent that more future information is generated by other new migrants, a larger
local network also implies that there will be fewer labors available who have not migrated, given the
ﬁxed total labors. That is, there will be fewer migrants in the future to generate more information.
Expecting less future information, a labor is more willing to migrate now. Finally, local network
may also raise the expected earnings from migration.
Once a rural labor decides to migrate, i.e., once the hurdle of hysteresis is surpassed, the length of
migration (e.g., days in the city) depends on the earnings potential. Here local network again helps
to maintain a longer migration period by raising the expected earnings. However, the information
service of networks will not aﬀect the migration length signiﬁcantly.
Based on the theoretical results, we empirically estimate the magnitude and sign of the infor-
mation and earnings eﬀects of migration networks in decisions about whether or not to migrate, as
well as about the length of migration. The data are obtained from a ﬁve year (1995 to 1999) survey
of farming and migration decisions of about 590 households in 29 villages from 9 provinces. We
adopt a two stage estimation procedure, where the ﬁrst stage estimates the eﬀects of networks on
migration earnings, its eﬀect on the length of migration, the variability in the size of the networks,
and the uncertainty in migration earnings. In the second stage, we jointly estimate a hurdle model
and a migration labor allocation model where the information and earnings eﬀects of networks are
separately identiﬁed. Preliminary analysis indicates that the both the information and earnings
eﬀects of networks are signiﬁcant. We also study how these eﬀects are inﬂuenced by household
characteristics, such as education, income, land area, and household size.
Existing literature on labor migration has identiﬁed the positive eﬀects of networks on migration
(Zhao (1999b), Zhao (1999a), and Zhang, Huang and Rozelle (2002)). But the literature failed to
distinguish between the information and earnings eﬀects, and the eﬀects on the hurdle of deciding
2to migrate and the length of migration. In fact, there are few papers that formally tackle the
issue of hysteresis in migration decisions (Epstein (2002) and Bauer, Epstein and Gang (2002)).
The contribution of our paper is to develop both theoretical and empirical models to identify these
separate eﬀects in China’s rural labor migration.
1 A Model of Labor Migration
Consider a village of N agents, and each agent can be in two states: either he is staying in the
village, or he has migrated. We call the agent in the ﬁrst state a farmer and that in the second
state a migrant. Let Na be the number of farmers and Nm the number of migrants, and let
N = {1,...,N}, N a = {1,...,Na},a n dN m = {Na +1 ,...,N}. Each agent is risk neutral, is
endowed with one unit of labor, lives for inﬁnite periods, and has a discount factor β<1.
At the beginning of a period, a farmer i ∈Na can decide either to stay in the agricultural sector
or to migrate. The agricultural payoﬀ per unit of labor is π(θa
i ), where θa
i represents the agent’s
agriculture characteristics such as the amount of land, the crops grown, etc. For simplicity, we take
θa
i as a scaler with π  > 0a n dπ   < 0. We also assume that the value of θa
i is common knowledge
among the villagers.
If the farmer decides to migrate, he can either stay the entire period or part of the period in the
urban area. The probability of ﬁnding a job in the urban area is p.1 The expected salary if he ﬁnds
aj o bi sw(θm
i ), where θm
i is his “type” or characteristics related to urban employment, such as his
education level, his training, etc. Again, θm
i is assumed to be a scaler with w  > 0a n dw   < 0.
Thus, if he stays in the urban area for an length of τ, his expected salary income is pw(θm
i )τ.W e
assume that θm
i is the private knowledge of agent i, and other agents hold the common belief that
θm
i is distributed on Θ = [θm, ¯ θm] with distribution function G0(·). The common beliefs about the
1For simplicity, we assume that p is constant over time and is independent of the number of migrants from this
village N
m. In general p depends on the macro-economic status of the urban economy. A village, being a smaller
player in the economy, will only play an negligible role in the urban labor market.
3types of diﬀerent agents are i.i.d.
The cost of living in the urban area is c(Nm) per unit of time, with c  < 0a n dc   > 0. The
cost being a function of Nm represents the role of migration networks: the more people in urban
areas from the same village, the lower cost it is to live in those areas. In addition to the cost of
living, the farmer has to incur a ﬁxed cost c0 to migrate: this cost may include the transportation
cost, the initial cost of settling down, etc. Thus, if a farmer decides to migrate, and spends τ time
period in the urban area, his total cost is c0 + τc(Nm).
In each period, a migrant allocates his time between working in the urban area, τm
i , and going
back to his village to work in agriculture, τa
i ,w i t hτm
i +τa
i = 1. Here we are allowing the maximum
ﬂexibility in a migrant’s labor choices. Given reasonable transportation costs, a migrant may decide
to work on land, say, during the harvest season, and work in the urban sector after that. Of course,
there are also many cases where the migrant could only work in the urban area so that τm
i =1 .
Let c1 be the ﬁxed cost of a migrant to go back to work on his land.
We now describe the agents’ information structure. At the beginning of period t,af a r m e rh a s
a belief about p, the probability of ﬁnding a job if he migrates. The belief is given by a nonatomic
densify function ft(·)o n[ 0 ,1]. Further, farmers in the same village share the same beliefs. The
beliefs may be based on the media, news from other villages, and most importantly, from observing
other migrants in his village.
To describe how migrants provide information to farmers about p,l e tf0(·) be the belief that is
obtained from sources other than the migrants. For simplicity, we assume that this belief remains
the same overtime. In each period, farmers observe how the migrants perform, i.e., whether or not
they have jobs in the urban area. Let N m
t be the set of migrants at the beginning of period t.E a c h
of them releases a signal si,w i t hsi = 1 if migrant i ﬁnds a job and si = 0 otherwise. Obviously, the
conditional probability of a signal s, conditional on a particular value of p,i sg i v e nb yh(s =1 |p)=p
and h(s =0 |p)=1− p. Since the probability of a migrant ﬁnding a job is independent of others’











Observing these signals, farmers update their beliefs about p in the Bayesian way. Given the prior







where h(st|p) is given in (1).
Thus, if more farmers migrate in period t, remaining farmers expect to obtain more information
about p by period t+1, as they will observe the signals of the new migrants. Let N a
t ⊆Na be the
set of farmers at the beginning of period t, N n
t ⊆Na
t be the set of farmers who decide to migrate
in period t,a n dsn
t = {si,i∈Nn
t } be their signals, with si ∈{ 0,1}. Then the set of signals at the
beginning of period t +1i sst+1 = st ∪ sn













Thus, the belief in period t+1 can be thought of as being obtained either through Bayesian updating
with ft(·) as the prior and sn
t as the signals, or with f0(·) as the prior and st+1 as the signals.
The second element in a farmer’s information structure is his belief about the types of remaining
farmers, θm
i ,f o ri ∈N a
t . This belief is important when the farmer forms expectations about how
many future signals about p he will obtain if he decides not to migrate in period t. For example,
suppose in equilibrium, only farmers with types higher than a threshold will migrate. If the farmer
believes that there are many farmers whose types pass this threshold, he may prefer to wait for the
many new signals he will receive before deciding to migrate. But if he believes that there are few
farmers with types higher than the threshold, the farmer may decide to migrate in this period as
waiting will not bring much new information about p. The updating of this belief depends on the
5strategies of the agents, which will be described later on.
Thus, a farmer’s migration decision has two steps: First, he decides whether or not he will
migrate, based on his beliefs about p and about the types of the remaining farmers. Due to the
ﬁxed cost of migration c0, a farmer facing much uncertainty but expecting more information about
p may decide to wait, even if migration brings higher expected payoﬀ than staying in agriculture.
Second, if he migrates, depending on whether he ﬁnds a job and his salary level, he decides how
much time to allocate to migration (τm
i ).
Before we formally deﬁne the migration game, we ﬁrst study the second stage decision of a
migrant to allocate time between migration and agriculture job. Since he is already in the urban
area, the migrant knows his probability of getting a job, p. If he stays, his expected payoﬀ rate is
pw(θm
i ) − c(Nm). His agricultural payoﬀ rate is π(θa
i ). In each period, if he has already stayed in
the urban area for a length of τ, he will go back to work in agriculture if and only if
(π(θa
i ) − pw(θm
i )+c(Nm))(1 − τ) >c 1. (4)
Thus, a larger migration network will help the migrant stay in the urban area longer. Further, the
longer a migrant has already stayed, the more likely that he will stay longer. In summary,
Proposition 1 A migrant stays longer in the urban area
( i )a st h em i g r a n t ’ st y p eθm
i is higher,
(ii) as the migrant’s agriculture characteristic θa
i is lower,
(iii) as the expected wage in the urban area increases,
(iv) as the farming payoﬀ decreases, and
(v) as the migration network gets larger.
Now we describe the migration game. At each time t, the set of players is the farmers N a
t , i.e.,
those agents who have not migrated. The history is comprised of the migration decisions that have
occurred so far, i.e., who has migrated and who has not migrated. Let H be the set of histories, and
6h ∈Hbe a particular history. A player’s type is θm
i , his private information, and his action space
is A = {0,1}, where 0 represents not migrating and 1 represents migration. Player i’s behavior
strategy bi(h,θm
i ) describes the probability with which he migrates, following history h.
We have already described how agents update their information about the probability of ﬁnding
aj o b ,p. Now we describe how agents form beliefs about the others’ types. Along the equilibrium
path, the agents update their beliefs according to Bayes. Let gi
t(θm
i ) be the common belief others
hold about the type of agent i.G i v e ni’s strategy bi(ht,θi
m)a n do b s e r v i n gi’s action ai =0 , or 1,
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We look for the symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the adoption game. Following
Fudenberg and Tirole (1993) (Section 8.2.3), we impose the condition that beliefs about the types
are updated in the Bayesian way whenever possible, even on paths reached with zero probability.
We also assume that the densify functions g0(·), f0(·), and h(·) are continuous and bounded above
and away from zero. In period t = 0, the number of migrants Nm
0 <Nis given.
Here we brieﬂy sketch the unique symmetric pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium of
the adoption game. The existence, uniqueness, and derivation of this equilibrium are provided in
the Appendix. We show that other things equal, the relative payoﬀ of migration and staying in
agriculture is increasing and concave in an agent’s type θm
i . Thus, the behavior strategy of a farmer
can be represented as follows: given any history ht, there exists a critical level θm∗
t (ht) such that
the farmer migrates if and only if θm
i ≥ θm∗
t (ht). Further, given the same expected probability of
ﬁnding a job, the more migrants there are in ht,t h el o w e rθm∗
t is, and the more farmers there are in
ht, the higher θm∗
t is. These results are intuitive: higher θm
i implies that farmer i receives a higher
salary if he migrates. Thus, it is more likely that he will migrate. As more farmers migrate, farmer
i has better information about p. Facing the same expected p, he is more willing to migrate if
armed with better information. If on the other hand, there are more farmers in ht, i would expect
7that more farmers will migrate in the future. That is, by waiting to migrate, he expects more
information about p that will be generated by the future new migrants. Thus he is more willing to
wait, and less willing to migrate.
In equilibrium, the migration process develops in the following pattern. Facing initial uncer-
tainty about p and about each other’s types, all farmers believe that only those with types higher
than θm∗
0 should migrate. Farmers with such types then migrate. If no farmer types are higher
than θm∗
0 , no farmers migrate, and they update their belief about each other’s type, based on the
new information that all types are below θm∗
0 . This will generate a new strategy where farmers
with types higher than θm∗
01 <θ m∗
0 should migrate. This process continues until there are farmers
who start to migrate.
After some farmers migrate, their career success in the urban area provides information about
p. The remaining farmers then update their belief about p, and form a new strategy where types
higher than θ1 should migrate. Depending on the signals about p, θ1 m a yb eh i g h e ro rl o w e rt h a n
θ0. For example, if the new migrants fail to ﬁnd any job, the remaining farmers may believe that
p is low, and decide not to migrate. On the other hand, if the signals do not change the expected
value of p, or indicate a higher p, some remaining farmers may want to migrate: now they are
armed with better information about p, as well as a larger migration network Nm
1 .T h a t i s , i f
θ1 <θ 0, more farmers will migrate, eventually. If, however, θ1 ≥ θ0, no more farmers migrate and
there is no updating about farmer types. The migration process stops.
From the equilibrium, we obtain the following Proposition, which also serves as the testable
hypothesis in the empirical model.
Proposition 2 In the symmetric PS-PBE, a farmer is more willing to migrate
(i) as the initial uncertainty about the probability of ﬁnding a job, p,d e c r e a s e s ,
(ii) as the farmer’s type θm
i increases, or as the expected income from migration increases,
(iii) as his agriculture characteristic θa
i decreases,
8(iv) as the migration network Nm increases, and
(v) as there are fewer farmers remaining in the village (i.e., as he expects less information from
new migrants in the future).
Comparing Propositions 1 and 2, we know while the migration decision depends on the initial
uncertainty about p and the number of remaining farmers, how long a migrant stays is independent
of these factors. The two Propositions also indicate the two roles of networks: it raises the expected
payoﬀ from migration, thus promoting both the length of stay and the incentive to migrate. It
further helps the incentive to migrate through reducing the uncertainties about the migration
payoﬀs.
2 The Empirical Model
In this section, we set up the empirical model used to estimate the two decision processes: the
decision to migrate, and the decision of how long to stay in the urban area once migrated. In
particular, we show how an agent responds to uncertainties in the migration payoﬀ, and the role
of networks in reducing the uncertainties and in raising migration payoﬀ.
The two stage decisions can be represented by the following sample selection model:
y1
i = β1X1
i +  1
di =

   








   
   
β2X2





where i =1 ,...,N indexes the agents, y1
i is the latent variable, di is the decision variable of
migration or no migration, and y2
i represents the length of stay in the urban area. Variables X1
i
9and X2
i are vectors of explanatory variables, and  1 and  2 are jointly normally distributed, with
var( 1)=1 ,v a r (  2)=σ2,a n dc o v (  1,  2)=ρ.
The ﬁrst equation in (6) represents the agent’s decision to migrate or not, and the latent variable
y1




following history h.T h u s , X1
i should include all variables that aﬀect the migration payoﬀ (e.g.,
the size of the migration network), the agricultural payoﬀ, the agent’s agricultural and migration
characteristics θa
i and θm
i , as well as the uncertainties about the probability of employment.2 We
do not have data on the employment status and the wage level. Instead, we only observe the gross
income earned by migrants. Thus, uncertainties in migration income are used in X1
i .
The last equation in (6) represents the decision of how long to stay in the urban area. As
indicated in the last section, variables aﬀecting this decision include the payoﬀs of migration and
agriculture, as well as the network size.
Equation (6) is estimated using the method of maximum likelihood. If agent i does not migrate,
we know y1
i ≤ 0o r 1 ≤− β1X1
i . If agent i migrates and stays in the urban area for a length of τi,
we know  1 > −β1X1
i ,a n d 2 = τi − β2X2














where Φ(·) is the Gaussian distribution function, and φ(·) is the joint normal density function
speciﬁed following (6).
We do not observe the uncertainties in migration payoﬀ directly. Instead, we adopt Appelbaum
and Ullah (1997) and obtain estimates of the payoﬀ uncertainty from an auxiliary estimation. Since
farmers in the same village share the same information, the following estimation equation is applied
2We do not have data that allow us to estimate the uncertainties about each other’s types. Thus we ignore this
variable in the estimation equation.
10to the village level data:
y3
j = β3X3
j +  3, (8)
where y3
j is the migration income of village j,a n dX3
j are the variables that inﬂuence this income,
such as migration network size. The estimated uncertainty in migration income is represented by
the square of the ﬁtted error (y3
j − ˆ y3
j)2.
3 Data and Estimation Results
The data come from a survey by Research Center for Rural Economy in China, conducted since 1986
in 29 provinces covering more than 20,000 households. The data used in our study are from 1995
to 1999, covering 590 households in 29 villages of 9 provinces. In total, we have 2742 observations.
Although the data set is a panel of ﬁve years, currently we ignore time dependence and treat
decisions in each year as independent of other years.
Each household is considered as a single agent. For this agent, we observe the total migration
income, the total agricultural income, the household head’s education level, the household size, etc.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in this study.
Table 2 shows the results of the auxiliary estimation, estimated using OLS. Models 1 and 2 are
used to estimate the uncertainties in migration income. The dependent variable is HAVMINC, the
average household migration income among migrant households in the village. It is related to the
macro-economic environment facing migrants from this village. Since this is the village average
migration income, an average migrant may expect to receive this income level. The uncertainty in
HAVMINC then represents the uncertainty in the expected income from migration. The estimated
uncertainty levels, i.e., the square of the residuals of the dependent variable, are represented as
XXX2 and XXX2L. The third moments of the residual are also calculated.
Models 1 and 2 diﬀer in whether the lagged HAVMINC is used as an independent variable.
11Using the lagged variable clearly improves the accuracy of estimation, but the model estimates do
not seem to be extremely sensitive to the inclusion.
In Models 3 and 4, we estimate the uncertainties in the network size, or the total migrants
of the village, EMMIGLAB. In latter models, this uncertainty, together with the uncertainty of
HAVMINC, will be used together to represent the information farmers have about the migration
payoﬀ. We include this uncertainty for two reasons. First, since the migration network aﬀects
the cost of migration and thus the migration payoﬀ, its uncertainty is relevant in the migration
decisions. Second, the network itself may represent uncertainties in urban employment that is not
captured by the uncertainty in HAVMINC. In Model 4, where the lagged dependent variable is
included, a unit root test may be required.
The squared residuals, used as the estimates of the uncertainty levels, are denoted as YYY2
and YYY2L, for the two models.
Table 3 presents results of the maximum likelihood estimation. The provincial dummies are
not reported. The three models reported diﬀer in some of the variables used in the estimation of
whether or not to migrate. All three models lead to similar estimates for the sign and magnitude
of the common variables. For example, education, household size, labor ratio, and male labor ratio
all signiﬁcantly raise the likelihood of migration, as well as the length of stay in urban areas. These
results are consistent with the literature. Village income level (INCOMEPPV) and the village
level oﬀ farm labor ratio (LABOR2RATIO) also signiﬁcantly and positively aﬀect migration and
duration. These variables may indicate that the labor force in a village is better trained in terms
of non-agricultural job, and thus help promote migration.
As expected, migration network (EMMIGLAB) positively and signiﬁcantly aﬀects both de-
cisions. Note that Model 7 used H(EMMIGLAB), the ﬁtted value of EMMIGLAB in the OLS
estimation in the previous stage (Model 4). Cropping income (CROPINC) negatively aﬀects the
decision to migrate and the migration duration, consistent with our theory.
12The village average migration income (HAVMINC) does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the decision to
migrate. It does signiﬁcantly and positively aﬀect the duration of stay in urban areas. Its ﬁtted
value obtained in Model 2 (H(HAVMINC)), however, does positively and signiﬁcantly aﬀect the
decision to migrate.
It is interesting to note that the total number of farmers, i.e., labors that have not migrated
(TOTALLAB), negatively aﬀects the decision to migrate. This result is rather unique in the liter-
ature, and is consistent with our equilibrium migration theory. It is consistent with the conjecture
that more non-migrant labor force means more potential migrants in the future, and thus more
future information. The incentive to migrate is reduced expecting the future information.
Across all three models, uncertainty in migration income (XXX2, or XXX2L) signiﬁcantly
reduces the incentive to migrate. Our results thus conﬁrm the theoretical conjecture that higher
uncertainty about migration payoﬀ, or less information, hinders migration. The uncertainty in
network size YYY2 or YYY2L is signiﬁcantly only in Model 5. In that model, it also negatively
aﬀects the decision to migrate.
4C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we developed a dynamic model with incomplete information to study farmers’ deci-
sions to migrate and their duration of stay in urban areas. We then formed an econometric model
based on the equilibrium migration behavior, and applied the model to rural labor migration data
in China. Our results conﬁrm the theoretical predictions that information about migration pay-
oﬀ, migration networks, and higher expected migration income all promote migration. On the
other hand, higher non-migration population and higher agricultural payoﬀ reduce the incentive to
migrate. Our model highlights the role of migration networks and information.
These results have important policy implications, especially with China joining the WTO. To
the extent that networks promote information, and information is important in migration decisions,
13policies that help the transmission of information about earning potentials will facilitate migration.
For example, governments may wish to help establish informal groups based on regions of origin
in urban areas. Since networks generate both information and earnings externalities for future
migrants, villages may subsidize early migrants, e.g., in the form of insurance and capital allocation.
If WTO successfully brings more jobs to urban areas, networks will become even more important
in helping facilitate the migration of rural labor.
1415P-values in the square brackets.
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